Transactions on Computational and Scientific Methods | Vo. 5, No. 8, 2025
ISSN: 2998-8780
https://pspress.org/index.php/tcsm
Pinnacle Science Press

Enterprise Network Security Through Modular Adaptive Intrusion Prevention System

Thayer Winslow
University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, USA
twl991@siue.edu

Abstract: As enterprise networks expand in complexity and scale, traditional intrusion prevention systems (IPS) struggle to provide adaptive, low-latency protection against evolving threats. This paper proposes a modular, telemetry-driven IPS framework designed for real-time intrusion mitigation in dynamic environments. The system architecture decouples detection logic from enforcement mechanisms, allowing independently deployable modules to perform traffic analysis and report confidence-weighted alerts to a centralized orchestration controller. A formal decision model aggregates these outputs and adapts policies using real-time feedback. Through simulation-based evaluations, the proposed system demonstrates a 31.5% reduction in detection latency and over 50% decrease in false positive rate compared to monolithic IPS designs. The results indicate that a modular, service-oriented IPS architecture enhances responsiveness, accuracy, and operational agility in enterprise settings.

Keywords: Network Security, Intrusion Prevention System, Modular Architecture, Telemetry Feedback, System Design, Adaptive Detection, SDN Security

1. Introduction

The rapid evolution of digital infrastructure and the increasing complexity of enterprise networks have significantly escalated cybersecurity risks. With the widespread adoption of cloud-native applications, virtualization, and remote work protocols, modern enterprise systems are now more vulnerable than ever to sophisticated cyberattacks such as distributed denial of service (DDoS), zero-day exploits, insider threats, and lateral movement attacks. Traditional intrusion prevention systems (IPS), which often rely on static rules or signature-based detection, have shown limited adaptability when confronted with novel or polymorphic threats. Furthermore, conventional IPS solutions are typically monolithic and lack modular flexibility, making it difficult to update or reconfigure them dynamically as new threat vectors emerge. This paper addresses these limitations by proposing a modular adaptive IPS framework tailored for enterprise environments, leveraging a system architecture that combines programmable detection engines, centralized control logic, and real-time network telemetry for dynamic decision-making. Unlike traditional systems, our design decouples detection logic from enforcement mechanisms, allowing independent deployment and update of detection modules, and supports runtime adjustment of policies through a software-defined security controller. The framework is designed to be deployable in virtualized environments, including hybrid cloud and container orchestration platforms, offering scalable protection without introducing significant latency or bottlenecks. By simulating a range of threat scenarios and comparing performance against baseline IPS solutions, we demonstrate that our modular architecture significantly reduces false

positives while maintaining competitive detection latency and improving adaptability. This study builds upon the foundations of distributed IDS [1], software-defined networking for security [2], and dynamic threat modeling [3], and integrates them into a cohesive system capable of responding to real-time security telemetry and adapting its behavior accordingly. Through detailed architectural design, theoretical analysis, and simulation results, this research contributes to the ongoing development of resilient and flexible network security infrastructures for large-scale enterprise systems.

2. Related Work

Network intrusion detection and prevention has been a longstanding focus in the field of cybersecurity, with extensive research on both signature-based and anomaly-based techniques. Early systems such as SNORT and Bro exemplified static rule-matching approaches, which, while efficient for known threats, struggled against novel attack variants and encrypted traffic patterns. To address these limitations, researchers introduced anomaly-based detection using statistical models and machine learning algorithms. Notably, the work by Sommer and Paxson [4] critiqued the limitations of applying machine learning naively in network intrusion detection, emphasizing the need for robust feature engineering and careful evaluation against evolving attack strategies. Later studies explored distributed intrusion detection systems (DIDS), as surveyed by Zhou et al. [5], which highlighted the importance of collaborative threat intelligence and cross-node correlation in identifying coordinated attacks in large-scale networks. These distributed architectures, however, often lacked centralized coordination and faced scalability challenges in heterogeneous enterprise settings. More recent advancements have focused on integrating intrusion detection capabilities into software-defined networking (SDN) environments. Works such as that of Scott-Hayward et al. introduced SDN-based intrusion prevention models where the control plane could dynamically adjust policies based on observed flows. Cárdenas et al. [6] further demonstrated the feasibility of real-time analytics using SDN for adaptive threat mitigation. In addition, approaches like DeDroid by Shabtai et al. and other modular frameworks showed the advantage of decoupling detection logic into independent components, allowing for flexible updates and specialization across different domains. Nevertheless, these solutions often lacked a unified architecture that supports runtime adaptability, modular orchestration, and telemetry-driven feedback loops. Our proposed framework differentiates itself by combining service-oriented modularization, centralized control, and runtime feedback adaptation to construct a scalable and reconfigurable IPS infrastructure suitable for modern enterprise networks. It extends the architectural flexibility of SDN-based systems and enhances the modular design philosophy with real-time policy refinement based on telemetry inference, drawing inspiration from dynamic trust modeling systems such as those explored by Ghorbani and colleagues [7].

3. System Architecture and Design

The proposed modular intrusion prevention framework is designed around the principles of architectural decoupling, runtime reconfigurability, and telemetry-driven feedback. At the core of the system is a centralized Security Orchestration Controller (SOC), which acts as a policy engine and coordination hub across distributed detection and mitigation modules. Each detection module is encapsulated as a microservice that can be independently deployed, updated, or terminated, enabling high agility in responding to evolving threats. These modules are containerized and integrated into the enterprise network through a service mesh that provides unified communication, monitoring, and access control. The overall design is illustrated in Figure 1. Incoming network traffic is duplicated by a lightweight traffic splitter and routed simultaneously to the monitoring bus and production path. The monitoring bus feeds traffic into the detection module cluster, where each module applies domain-specific logic—such as deep packet inspection, behavior profiling, or anomaly scoring—to generate alerts and telemetry feedback. Detection results are fed

to the SOC, which applies a confidence-weighted consensus algorithm to determine whether to trigger a mitigation response. If confirmed, the SOC communicates with enforcement agents—such as software-defined firewalls, switch-level ACLs, or container runtime security plugins—to block malicious flows or quarantine endpoints. Crucially, the SOC periodically updates its response policies using telemetry statistics, allowing adaptive refinement of its detection confidence thresholds and module weightings. This feedback loop enables dynamic adaptation without requiring full system redeployment. The architecture is compatible with hybrid cloud environments and supports edge-deployed lightweight agents for low-latency decision-making in branch offices or IoT subnetworks. To prevent bottlenecks, the monitoring plane is isolated from the forwarding plane using a parallel data channel, and all inter-module communications use asynchronous message queues to maximize concurrency. The design supports horizontal scaling by instantiating detection modules as needed based on observed load and threat density. This modular approach aligns with modern DevSecOps practices and ensures that security logic can evolve independently of infrastructure deployment cycles.



Figure 1. Modular Intrusion Prevention System Architecture

4. Theoretical Model and Detection Logic

To support dynamic and modular decision-making in intrusion prevention, our system employs a confidence-weighted ensemble model to integrate outputs from heterogeneous detection modules. Each module M_i produces a binary classification $y_i \in \{0,1\}$, where 1 denotes detection of a threat and 0 represents benign behavior. Simultaneously, each module reports a normalized confidence score $c_i \in [0,1]$ based on internal thresholds, model certainty, or anomaly magnitude. The system aggregates these outputs using a weighted summation mechanism to compute an overall threat score SSS for a given flow or session as:

$$S = \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i \cdot c_i \cdot y_i$$

This formulation allows the SOC to balance sensitivity and precision adaptively, leveraging consensus among specialized modules rather than relying on any single point of failure. The mathematical abstraction

also facilitates simulation and tuning of system behavior under synthetic traffic datasets, allowing security engineers to visualize the tradeoff curve between detection latency and false positive rate under varying network conditions.

5. Experimental Evaluation

To evaluate the performance and responsiveness of the proposed modular intrusion prevention system, we conducted a series of controlled virtual simulations using synthetic network traffic flows generated by a customized testbed based on Mininet and Scapy. The experimental environment emulated a mid-scale enterprise topology with 12 internal hosts, one external traffic gateway, and three detection modules deployed as containerized services: a signature-based DPI module, a statistical anomaly detector, and a temporal behavior model. For comparison, we implemented a monolithic baseline IPS system using a unified rule engine with static configuration. The testbed was subjected to mixed traffic consisting of normal web browsing, file transfer sessions, and injected malicious behaviors (e.g., port scanning, command-and-control beacons, and simulated ransomware payloads). Each session was labeled with ground truth to compute performance metrics. The results were measured over 5000 independent flow instances and are summarized in Table I. Three key performance indicators were evaluated: detection latency (time from packet arrival to decision enforcement), false positive rate (benign flows incorrectly blocked), and dynamic reconfigurability (measured by module restart time and policy update delay).

Table1: Performance Comparison between Traditional IPS and Proposed Modular IPS Framework

System	Avg. Detection Latency (ms)	False Positive Rate (%)	Policy Update Latency (s)
Traditional Monolithic IPS	42.8	7.6	N/A (Static)
Proposed Modular IPS	29.3	3.4	0.84

As seen from the table, the modular IPS exhibits a 31.5% reduction in average detection latency due to parallelized processing and microservice isolation, which eliminates the bottlenecks present in monolithic decision pipelines. More importantly, the false positive rate is reduced by over 50%, attributed to the confidence-weighted ensemble model and adaptive thresholding mechanism described earlier. The policy update latency, non-existent in static systems, is kept below one second, enabling the SOC to respond to evolving threats or false alarm corrections with minimal delay. These metrics demonstrate that the proposed architecture not only improves accuracy and responsiveness but also enables agile operations in dynamic threat landscapes. While these results are based on virtual simulations, they provide compelling evidence for the efficacy and practicality of modular, telemetry-driven IPS deployment in modern enterprise environments.

6. Conclusion

This paper presented a modular, adaptive intrusion prevention system architecture designed for scalable deployment in enterprise networks. By integrating a centralized orchestration controller with distributed detection microservices, the proposed framework overcomes the rigidity and limitations of traditional monolithic IPS solutions. The system incorporates a confidence-weighted ensemble decision model that supports real-time policy refinement based on network telemetry feedback, enabling dynamic adaptability to novel or polymorphic threats. Through simulation-based experiments, we demonstrated that the architecture achieves superior detection latency, reduced false positive rates, and rapid reconfigurability when compared

to conventional IPS designs. Furthermore, the formalized model allows for parameter tuning and theoretical analysis of trade-offs between detection sensitivity and system overhead. While the current evaluation is limited to synthetic environments, future work will focus on deploying the system in real enterprise networks, integrating advanced detection modules such as graph-based anomaly detectors and federated learning agents for decentralized threat intelligence sharing. In addition, future research will address the resilience of the orchestration controller under adversarial conditions and explore mechanisms for trust-aware module selection in the presence of compromised or noisy detectors. The modular framework introduced in this work provides a foundation for building next-generation, software-defined, and self-adaptive network security infrastructures capable of coping with the increasing scale and sophistication of cyber threats.

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